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RACE SEGREGATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
JIM CROW AT THE JUDGMENT SEAT
EDWARD F. WAITs*
In December, 1952, five cases were argued in the Supreme Court
of the United States, the decision of which is still eagerly, even
anxiously, awaited by the entire country. Indeed, it promises to be
one of the most momentous decisions ever rendered by our national
court of last resort. It is expected to settle a vitally important
question on which state and subordinate federal courts have passed
many times and in different ways, but which the Supreme Court has
hitherto consistently avoided-some might say evaded, but we
should not forget the salutary rule that the Court will not make a
new interpretation of the Constitution unless required for deter-
mination of the case at bar.
Do our public schools, insofar as under state constitutions or by
statute law they separate children of the white race from those
of the colored races, on the sole ground of race or color, there-
by violate the Federal Constitution?
The writer seeks to add to the common understanding of this
decision by presenting in advance a factual review of the previous
holdings of the Supreme Court involving race in the field of state-
supported education.
In twenty-one states and the District of Columbia separate pub-
lic schools for white and "colored" children are permitted by the
state constitution or by statute, usually with the proviso that facili-
ties shall be substantially equal. Segregation is mandatory in seven-
teen states, and four of these require it in private schools also.
Whether segregation in the District of Columbia is obligatory un-
der Acts of Congress has been questioned.
Since 1896 the rule of "substantial equality" has been recognized
even when not expressed in the written law. A Negro (of Y8 Cauca-
sian blood and Y8 African) who was a railway passenger between
local points in Louisiana, was forcibly ejected from a coach re-
served for whites under a state law which required railways carry-
ing passengers to provide "equal but separate accommodations for
the white and colored races," and forbade under penalty persons of
the different races "to occupy seats in coaches other than the ones
assigned to them on account of the race they belong to." The pas-
senger was prosecuted and claimed by way of defense that the
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statute was invalid under the 14th Amendment. The relevant por-
tion of this Amendment, which took effect in 1868, is as follows:
"Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any per-
son of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."
The case went to the Supreme Court, where of the nine sitting
Justices six had been appointed by Republican Presidents and three
by President Cleveland. It involved no claim that the coaches pro-
vided for colored passengers were inferior to those assigned to
whites: the single issue was as to the validity of discrimination
based on race. The Court held it to be a reasonable regulation of
railway traffic, and therefore a valid exercise of the police power
of the state and not discrimination within the prohibitions of the
U. S. Constitution.'
This decision has been accepted as adopting the test of equality
of facilities in cases involving compulsory segregation of the races
by law. In the course of the opinion Justice Brown, who spoke for
the Court, said: "So far, then, as conflict with the 14th Amendment
is concerned, the case reduces itself to the question whether the
statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation, and with respect to
this there must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the
legislature. In determining the question of reasonableness it is at
liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs and
traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their
comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order.
Gauged by this standard, we cannot say that a law which authorizes
or even requires the separation of the two races in public convey-
ances is unreasonable or more obnoxious to the 14th Amendment
than the acts of Congress requiring separate schools for colored
children in the District of Columbia, the constitutionality of which
does not seem to have been questioned, or the corresponding acts
of state legislatures."
The sole dissenter was Justice Harlan, a Kentuckian, who said:
"I deny that any legislative body or judicial tribunal may have
regard to the race of citizens when the civil rights of those citizens
are involved. Indeed, such legislation as is here in question is in-
1. Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896).
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consistent, not only with that equality of rights which pertains to
citizenship, national and state, but with the personal liberty enjoyed
by every one within the United States. . . . Our Constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citi-
zens .... The thin disguise of 'equal' accommodations for passen-
gers in railroad coaches will not mislead anyone, or atone for the
wrong this day done."
Rather strangely, as it seems to many lawyers, the reference by
Justice Brown to the public schools, although only a part of the
Court's argument for the reasonableness of segregation as a police
measure, has been accepted in later cases as making Plessy v.
Ferguson an authoritative precedent for the "separate but equal"
doctrine in litigation involving public schools as well as transporta-
tion in public conveyances.
Not until 1899 was the race issue in the public schools brought
directly before the Supreme Court in any form.2 The only issue pre-
sented by the attorneys for certain Georgia Negro plaintiffs was
whether, conceding the validity of the state's "separate but equal"
school law, the school authorities had made a discriminatory and
unlawful appropriation of public funds. The facts were complicated
and Justice Harlan, presenting the opinion for the unanimous Court,
held that this was not shown. The narrow limits of the decision
appear in his concluding words: "The education of the people in
schools maintained by state" taxation is a matter belonging to the
respective states, and any interference on the part of federal au-
thority with the management of such schools cannot be justified
except in the case of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights
secured by the supreme law of the land. We have here no such
case to be determined; and as this view disposes of the only question
which this court has jurisdiction to review and decide, the judg-
ment is affirmed." The elimination from the case of any constitu-
tional issue could hardly be more emphatic.
Discrimination in education was next before the Supreme Court
in 1908 in Berea College v. Commonwealth of Kentucky.8 Although
public, tax-supported education was not involved, the same seems
appropriate to include in this review. A Kentucky statute made it un-
lawful under heavy penalties for any person, corporation or associa-
tion of persons to maintain or operate any college, school or insti-
tution where persons of the white and colored races are together
received as pupils for instruction. Berea College, a private corpora-
tion created by an Act of the Kentucky legislature, was prosecuted
2. See Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U. S. 528 (1899).
3. 211 U. S. 45 (1908).
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for violating the statute and convicted. In defense it attacked its
validity under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court expressly
eliminated the constitutional question thus sought to be raised and
held the statute to be valid, as applied to the college, on grounds
peculiar to its corporate charter. Justices Harlan and Day dissented,
the former urging that the constitutional question ought to be met
and decided. "My observations," he said, "have reference to the
case before the court and only to the provision of the statute making
it a crime for any person to impart harmless instruction to white
and colored persons together, at the same time, in the same private
institution of learning."
Gong Lurn v. Rice,4 decided in 1927, was a petition for an order
of court (mandamus) for admission of a Chinese child born in the
United States to a public school maintained, pursuant to the Missis-
sippi constitution, for whites only. This constitutional provision was
not attacked in the state courts, the claim of the petitioners being
merely that a person of Mongolian descent should not be classed as
"colored." The claim was rejected by the highest Mississippi court,5
and as the case went to Washington that was the only issue before
the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Taft wrote the opinion, which was
unanimous, sustaining the Mississippi decision. Justice Harlan's
voice had been stilled in death. "The question here," said the court,
"is whether a Chinese citizen of the United States is denied equal
protection of the laws when he is classed among the colored races
and furnished facilities for education equal to that offered to all,
whether white, brown, yellow or black." (To make the question
complete and accurate, should he not have added-but denied ad-
mission to white schools on the ground of color?) "Were this a new
question it would call for very full argument and consideration,
but we think that it is the same question which has been many times
decided to be within the constitutional powers of the state legis-
lature to settle without the intervention of the federal courts under
the Federal Constitution [citing cases]. Most of the cases arose, it
is true, over the establishment of separate schools as between white
pupils and black pupils, but we cannot think that the question is
any different or that any different result can be reached, assuming
the cases above cited to be rightly decided, where the issue is as
between white pupils and the pupils of the yellow races. The deci-
sion is within the discretion of the state in regulating its public
schools, and does not conflict with the 14th Amendment."
An analysis of the cases thus cited as conclusive in support of
4. 275 U. S. 78 (1927).
5. 139 Miss. 760, 104 So. 105 (1925).
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the "separate but equal" doctrine yields noteworthy results. The
only Supreme Court case is Plessy v. Ferguson. Three cases came
up from inferior federal courts and twelve from state courts. One of
the latter group, Roberts v. City of Boston," bore the great name of
Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts, but its sanction for a con-
struction of the Fourteenth Amendment would seem to be affected
by the fact that it was decided many years before the Amendment
was framed. The essence of the Gong Lim decision was that, there
being no question raised in the case as to the validity of segregation
of colored pupils, the State of Mississippi was within its rights in
classifying a Chinese child as "colored" within the meaning of the
law.
In 1935 Lloyd Gaines, a Negro, was refused admission to the
Law School of the University of Missouri on the ground that it
was "contrary to the constitution, laws and public policy to admit
a Negro as a student at the University of Missouri." On his appli-
cation for relief the Missouri courts denied a writ of mandamus
to require his admission as applied for.7 He was a graduate of
Lincoln University, an institution maintained by the state for the
higher education of Negroes, and it was admitted that his work and
credits there would qualify him for the Law School of the Univer-
sity of Missouri, if otherwise eligible. Lincoln University did not
have a law school, but there had been what the Supreme Court of
Missouri styled "a legislative purpose to establish" one "whenever
necessary and practicable," and a 1929 statute provided as fol-
lows: "Pending the full development of the Lincoln University, the
board of curators shall have authority to arrange for the attendance
of Negro residents of the State of Missouri at the University of
any adjacent state to take any course or to study any subjects
provided for at the State University of Missouri, and which are
not taught at the Lincoln University, and to pay the reasonable
tuition fees for such attendance."
On review in the United States Supreme Court,8 Chief justice
Hughes presented the opinion. He recognized, without discussion,
"separate but equal" as the applicable law. That was the state's
position and nothing different was claimed by the other side. On
the issue of equality the Court reversed the Missouri court, say-
ing-"The white resident is afforded legal education within the
state; the Negro resident having the same qualifications is refused it
there and must go outside the state to obtain it. That is a denial of
6. 5 Cush. 198 (Mass. 1849).
7. 342 Mo. 121, 113 S. W. 2d 783 (1938).
8. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938).
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the equality of legal right to the enjoyment of the privilege which
the state has set up, and the provision for the payment of tuition
fees in another state does not remove the discrimination. The equal
protection of the laws is 'a pledge of the protection of equal laws.' "
For more than a quarter of a century there has been no pro-
nouncement by the Supreme Court on race discrimination in public
elementary and high schools. But on the issue of discrimination in
state-supported institutions of higher learning there have been sev-
eral cases. In no one of these has the Court met the fundamental
issue under the Constitution, which is segregation on the ground
of race per se. In each case the sole question was as to equality of
facilities. In 1848 the Gaines precedent was twice applied by the
Supreme Court to Negro students seeking admission to the Law
School of the University of Oklahoma9 but nothing was involved in
either case which requires mention here.
The facts in Sweatt z. Painter,0 decided in 1950, are sufficiently
shown in the official syllabus of the case: "Petitioner was denied ad-
mission to the state-supported University of Texas Law School,
solely because he is a Negro and state law forbids the admission of
Negroes to that Law School. He was offered, but refused, enrollment
in a separate law school newly established by the State for Negroes.
The University of Texas Law School has sixteen full-time and three
part-time professors, 850 students, a library of 65,000 volumes, a
law review, moot court facilities, scholarship funds, an Order of
the Coif affiliation, many distinguished alumni, and much tradition
and prestige. The separate law school for Negroes has five full-time
professors, 23 students, a library of 16,520 volumes, a practice court,
a legal aid association and one alumnus admitted to the Texas Bar;
but it excludes from its student body members of racial groups
which number 85% of the population of the State and which include
most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges, and other officials
with whom petitioner would deal as a member of the Texas Bar.
Held: The legal education offered petitioner is not substantially
equal to that which he would receive if admitted to the University
of Texas Law School; and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that he be admitted to the Uni-
versity of Texas Law School." The opinion was written by Chief
justice Vinson and was unanimous. Briefs submitted (one on be-
half of the Committee of Law Teachers against Segregation in
Legal Education, signed by members of the faculty of six leading
9. See Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631 (1948); Fisher v.
Hurst, 333 U. S. 147 (1948).
10. 339 U. S. 629 (1950).
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law schools) argued against all race discrimination in state-sup-
ported education, and urged that Plessy v. Ferguson be overruled.
The Court, while declining to regard that case as requiring affirm-
ance of the Texas decision, declared that it was not necessary to
reach petitioner's contention that the Plessy case should be re-
examined "in the light of contemporary knowledge respecting the
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and the effects of racial
segregation." Again the rule was declared that "this Court will de-
cide constitutional questions only when necessary to the disposition
of the case at hand, and that such decisions will be drawn as nar-
rowly as possible."
On the same day with Sweatt the Court decided McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents.' Here too the facts are shown in a para-
graph of the official syllabus: "Appellant, a Negro citizen of Okla-
homa possessing a master's degree, was admitted to the Graduate
School of the state-supported University of Oklahoma as a candi-
date for a doctorate in education and was permitted to use the same
classroom, library and cafeteria as white students. Pursuant to a re-
quirement of state law that the instruction of Negroes in state in-
stitutions of higher education be 'upon a segregated basis,' however,
he was assigned to a seat in the classroom in a row specified for
Negro students, was assigned to a special table in the library, and
though permitted to eat in the cafeteria at the same time as other
students, was assigned to a special table there. Held: The conditions
under which appellant is required to receive his education deprive
him of his personal and present right to the equal protection of the
laws; and the Fourteenth Amendment precludes such differences in
treatment by the State based upon race."
The Chief Justice, again speaking for a unanimous Court, said:
"These restrictions were obviously imposed in order to comply, so
nearly as could be, with the statutory requirements of Oklahoma.
But they signify that the State, in administering the facilities it
affords for professional and graduate study, sets McLaurin apart
from the other students. The result is that appellant is handicapped
in his pursuit of effective graduate instruction. Such restrictions
impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and
exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his
profession. . .. State-imposed restrictions which produce such in-
equalities cannot be sustained." Does this standard for permissible
discretion, when contrasted with that of public tradition, custom and
convenience declared a half-century before in the Plessy case, indi-
11. 339 U. S. 637 (1950).
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cate a change in the scope of recognized "judicial discretion" which
must have a bearing on segregation in the public schools, especially
in view of compulsory attendance laws which were not discussed in
any previous decision?
Why the presentation of the fundamental question of segrega-
tion per se in such form that it could not be escaped has been post-
poned for 85 years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is an interesting question which may not be discussed here.
At last the moment has arrived, and Jim Crow in the public schools
is at the judgment seat.
Brief reference to each of the five pending cases will be helpful.
The definite movement to force the issue seems to have begun in
South Carolina, at least as early as 1950, under the leadership of
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
Article XI, Section 7, of the Constitution of South Carolina is as
follows: "Separate schools shall be provided for the children of the
white and colored races, and no child of either race shall ever be
permitted to attend a school provided for children of the other race."
Briggs v. Elliott,12 was heard before three district judges, on a
petition of parents of Negro children for a declaratory judgment
and injunctive relief, alleging inequality in school facilities and
specifically attacking all discrimination on the ground of race. In-
equality was admitted and ordered to be promptly corrected. Two
judges upheld the "separate but equal" doctrine, and rendered a
decision accordingly. One member of the Court, Judge Waring,
dissented, arguing elaborately that segregation is per se inequality
and unconstitutional.
In 1949 the Kansas legislature enacted a law authorizing cities
of the first class to organize and maintain separate schools for white
and colored children in grades below high-school, and the city of
Topeka thereupon set up a system of separate schools for the first
six grades. This law was attacked in 1951 in Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka. 3 It was held valid, although facilities for
white and colored children were found to be substantially equal.
Virginia provides by law that "white and colored persons shall
not be taught in the same school, but shall be taught in separate
schools, under the same general regulations as to management, use-
fulness and efficiency." In Davis v. County School Board of Prince
Edward County," the court found the facilities of the Negro schools
12. 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D. S.C. 1951).
13. 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951).
14. 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952).
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in question substantially inferior to those of the whites, but upheld
the constitutionality of discrimination on the sole ground of race.
For many years racial discrimination in the public schools of the
District of Columbia has been maintained under the accepted au-
thority of certain Acts of Congress, Congress having control under
the Constitution of the internal affairs of the District. A case in-
volving this practice, Boiling v. Sharpe,5 which was pending in the
District in 1952, was removed by order to the Supreme Court be-
fore decision for the purpose of being heard there with the other
cases involving the school segregation issue. There was no issue
as to equality of facilities, and the construction of the Fourteenth
Amendment is not directly involved.
The fifth case, Gebhart v. Belton, 6 was the last admitted to the
group which now holds so large a place in the public eye. It was
brought on appeal to the Supreme Court of Delaware in 1952. The
relief sought in the lower court was a declaratory judgment that the
"separate but equal" provision of the Delaware constitution is con-
trary to the "equal protection clause" of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, together with demand for an injunction restraining the school
authorities from denying to certain Negro pupils admittance to
schools maintained for whites, on the ground of substantial inferiority
of school facilities. The trial court denied the declaratory judgment
but found for the plaintiffs on the issue of inequality and granted
an injunction. Both sides appealed. The Supreme Court of Dela-
ware affirmed the decision of the lower court, and in November,
1952, the Supreme Court of the United States consented to review
the case'7 with the others of like nature then about to be heard.
Although ten hours were given to these cases at the hearings in
December, 1952, they were not decided the following summer, as
was quite generally expected. Instead, orders were filed June 8,
1953, restoring each case to the calendar for further argument on
the following points:
"1. What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted
and the State legislatures and conventions which ratified the Four-
teenth Amendment contemplated or did not contemplate, under-
stood or did not understand, that it would abolish segregation in
public schools?
2. If neither the Congress in submitting nor the states in ratify-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment understood that compliance with
it would require the immediate abolition of segregation in public
15. 345 U. S. 972 (1953).
16. 91 A. 2d 137 (Del. 1952).
17. 344 U. S. 891 (1952).
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schools, was it nevertheless the understanding of the framers of
the Amendment
(a) that future Congresses might, in the exercise of their power
under Section 5 of the Amendment [to enforce the provisions of
the Article by appropriate legislation] abolish such segregation, or
(b) that it would be within judicial power, in light of future
conditions, to construe the Amendment as abolishing such segrega-
tion of its own force?
3. On the assumption that the answers to questions 2(a) and
(b) do not dispose of the issue, is it within the judicial power, in
construing the Amendment, to abolish segregation in public schools?
4. Assuming it to be decided that segregation in public schools
violates the Fourteenth Amendment
(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within
the limits set by normal geographic school districting, Negro chil-
dren should forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, or
(b) may the Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, per-
mit an effective gradual adjustment to be brought about from exist-
ing segregated systems to a system not based on color distinc-
tions ?" 8
A fifth question related to the way the details of appropriate
remedies might be arrived at, on the assumption of Question 4.
The further hearings on December 7, 8 and 9, consumed eleven
hours, and the current comments of members of the Court sug-
gested much interest and differing lines of thought.-9 A noteworthy
feature was that the Department of Justice, which participated in
the argument at the suggestion of the Court, took the position "that
segregation in the public schools cannot be maintained under the
Fourteenth Amendment."
If our Supreme Court, charged with final and authoritative in-
terpretation of the Constitution, has hitherto given less than due
attention to the tremendously important question now under con-
sideration, the mistake will not now be repeated.
Said Justice Harlan, dissenting in the Plessy case, "In my
opinion the judgment this day rendered will in time prove to be
quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the
Dred Scott case." Dred Scott was wiped from American law by
civil war and the Thirteenth Amendment. Plessy v. Ferguson will
now stand or fall after as careful study as has ever been given to
any matter in any judicial tribunal.
18. 345 U. S. 972-973 (1953).
19. 22 IT. S. L. Week 3157 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1953).
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